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Flagg Bros. and State Action: Foreclosing the
Fourteenth Amendment
INTRODUCTION

Aggrieved debtors in recent years have challenged the constitutionality of various creditor remedies' under section 1983.2 To prevail in a section 1983 action, the debtor must establish that a consti-3
tutionally protected right was violated under color of state law.
Accordingly, the debtor alleges that the creditor, acting pursuant to
state law,' has violated the fourteenth amendment 5 by depriving the
1. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) (utility termination); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnishment);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972) (replevin); Johnson v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978) (attachment); Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977) (garageman's lien); Stypmann v.
City of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1977) (towing lien); Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank,
530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976) (foreign attachment); Hall v. Garson, 430-F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970)
(landlord's lien); Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976) (extra-judicial
mortgage foreclosure); Hamrick v. Ashland Finance Co., 423 F. Supp. 1033 (S.D.W. Va. 1976)
(detinue); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (distraint).
2. The full text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) reads as follows:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings, for redress.
Section 1983's jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976), provides in relevant part:
Civil rights and elective franchise. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
3. Under color of state law has been defined as follows:
"Under color of" law focuses on whether the person who committed the deprivation
acted or purported to act by authority conferred by the state . . . . If the § 1983
defendant is a private individual, color of law means, at least, that he must have
acted "with the knowledge of and pursuant to" a state statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage. If the defendant is a public official, however, it is enough
that he acts by virtue of his official position, since he is clothed with power that
flows from the state.
Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 664-65 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (citations
omitted).
4. For the purposes of this discussion, state law comprises both statutory and common
law.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
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debtor of his property without due process of law. The fourteenth
amendment, however, prohibits only deprivations by the state.' To
establish the requisite state action, a nexus between the state and
the private creditor's conduct must exist.' Absent state action, no
violation of a constitutional right occurs, and the court must dismiss
the section 1983 suit. This dismissal precludes resolution of the
ultimate issue whether the creditor's remedy comports with mini8
mum due process standards.
A difficult question concerning state action arises when a private
warehouseman, in accordance with section 7-210 of the Uniform
Commercial Code,' attempts to foreclose his possessory lien on a
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
6. "Individual invasions of individual rights is not the subject matter of the [fourteenth]
amendment." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). "[Tlhe prohibitions of the
amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority." Id. at 13. This
private-public dichotomy underlies the concept of state action. Although the fourteenth
amendment requires state action, it does not attempt to define the concept.
The language of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . does not refer to the existence of
acts of commission by state governments as being a prerequisite to the application
of its substantive restrictions. The Amendment reads that "no State shall make or
enforce . . . deprive . . . or deny" certain rights. It says nothing about what state
action (or inaction) will constitute a "making or enforcing," "depriving" or
"denying."
Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action"
Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. Rav. 221, 228 [hereinafter cited as Glennon & Nowak].
7. See notes 43 to 49 infra and accompanying text.
8. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and the opportunity to be heard.
See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
The finding of no state action has foreclosed due process analysis of numerous creditor
remedies. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (utility termination); Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978) (self-help repossession); Charmicor v.
Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1978) (extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976) (innkeeper's lien).
9. U.C.C. § 7-210, Enforcement of Warehouseman's Lien, provides in its entirety:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a warehouseman's lien may be enforced by public or private sale of the goods in block or in parcels, at any time or
place and on any terms which are commercially reasonable, after notifying all
persons known to claim an interest in the goods. Such notification must include a
statement of the amount due, the nature of the proposed sale and the time and
place of any public sale. The fact that a better price could have been obtained by
a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the warehouseman is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a
commercially reasonable manner. If the warehouseman either sells the goods in the
usual manner in any recognized market therefor, or if he sells at the price current
in such market at the time of his sale, or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with
commercially reasonable practices among dealers in the type of goods sold, he has
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debtor's stored goods."0 This statute authorizes a warehouseman to
sell goods entrusted to him in order to collect delinquent storage
payments. The sale does not require either prior judicial authorization or direct participation by any state official. This lack of overt
state involvement complicates the state action inquiry.
Judicial response to the question of state action under section 7sold in a commercially reasonable manner. A sale of more goods than apparently
necessary to be offered to insure satisfaction of the obligation is not commercially
reasonable except in cases covered by the preceding sentence.
(2) A warehouseman's lien on goods other than goods stored by a merchant in
the course of his business may be enforced only as follows:
(a) All persons known to claim an interest in the goods must be notified.
(b) The notification must be delivered in person or sent by registered or certified
letter to the last known address of any person to be notified.
(c) The notification must include an itemized statement of the claim, a description of the goods subject to the lien, a demand for payment within a specified time
not less than ten days after receipt of the notification, and a conspicuous statement
that unless the claim is paid within that time the goods will be advertised for sale
and sold by auction at a specified time and place.
(d) The sale must conform to the terms of the notification.
(e) The sale must be held at the nearest suitable place to that where the goods
are held or stored.
(f) After the expiration of the time given in the notification, an advertisement of
the sale must be published once a week for two weeks consecutively in a newspaper
of general circulation where the sale is to be held. The advertisement must include
a description of the goods, the name of the person on whose account they are being
held, and the time and place of the sale. The sale must take place at least fifteen
days after the first publication. If there is no newspaper of general circulation where
the sale is to be held, the advertisement must be posted at least ten days before
the sale in not less than six conspicuous places in the neighborhood of the proposed
sale.
(3) Before any sale pursuant to this section any person claiming a right in the
goods may pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the reasonable expenses
incurred under this section. In that event the goods must not be sold, but must be
retained by the warehouseman subject to the terms of the receipt and this Article.
(4) The warehouseman may buy at any public sale pursuant to this section.
(5) A purchaser in good faith of goods sold to enforce a warehouseman's lien
takes the goods free of any rights of persons against whom the lien was valid, despite
noncompliance by the warehouseman with the requirements of this section.
(6) The warehouseman may satisfy his lien from the proceeds of any sale pursuant to this section but must hold the balance, if any, for delivery on demand to
any person to whom he would have been bound to deliver the goods.
(7) The rights provided by this section shall be in addition to all other rights
allowed by law to a creditor against his debtor.
(8) Where a lien is on goods stored by a merchant in the course of his business
the lien may be enforced in accordance with either subsection (1) or (2).
(9) The warehouseman is liable for damages caused by failure to comply with
the requirements for sale under this section and in case of willful violation is liable
for conversion.
This provision has been adopted by 49 states and the District of Columbia.
10. A possessory lien arises where the creditor has the right to possession of the debtor's
property until the underlying debt is satisfied. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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210 has been mixed." To resolve this conflict, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks.'2 This
comment will examine the Supreme Court's analysis of state action
in a commercial setting. The procedural due process issue left unresolved by Flagg will also be discussed. Finally, the article will consider the potential impact of the decision on other creditor remedies.
BACKGROUND

Several courts have addressed the issue whether the warehouseman's right of summary sale, as authorized by section 7-210, constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law. 3 Analysis typically starts at the threshold requirement of state action. 4 In
Melara v. Kennedy," the Ninth Circuit concluded that the private
warehouseman's conduct did not constitute state action. In Melara,
the debtor contested his liability for storage costs because his household goods were stored without his knowledge. 6 In compliance with
section 7-210, the storage company sent the debtor a foreclosure of
lien notice. The debtor then commenced suit under section 1983,
challenging the proposed extra-judicial sale of his goods as a violation of due process.
The Melara court noted that the due process question need not
be reached unless the proposed sale equalled state action. 7 Because
the debtor challenged the conduct of a private individual, the court
adopted a higher standard for state action than it would have if the
case had involved a public official. When a party challenges private
11. Compare Cox Bakeries, Inc. v. Timm Moving & Storage, Inc., 554 F.2d 356 (8th Cir.
1977) with Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976). See notes 15-25 infra and
accompanying text.
12. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
13. See Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977); Cox Bakeries, Inc. v. Timm
Moving & Storage, Inc., 554 F. 2d 356 (8th Cir. 1977); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th
Cir. 1976); Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Smith v.
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Magro v. Lentini Bros.
Moving & Storage, 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972).
14. But see Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage, 338 F. Supp. 464, 466 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), aff'd mem., 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972), where the court
found there was no violation of due process without initially deciding the state action question.
15. 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
16. Id. at 803. In Melara, a conservator sold the debtor's home. Subsequently, the household furnishings were entrusted to defendant storage company. It is unclear whether the
conservator or the agent for the purchaser of the home placed the goods in storage; only the
conservator had actual authority to do so. Because the storage may have been unauthorized,
a bona fide dispute concerning the debtor's liability existed.
17. Id. at 804.
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conduct, the level of state involvement should be "significant."'"
-The court concluded that a sale under section 7-210 did not meet
this standard.' The court initially reasoned that mere statutory
authorization of the summary sale did not suffice. 0 Although the
statute expanded the warehouseman's common law rights, this fact
was also not determinative. 2 ' Moreover, because the extra-judicial
sale required neither seizure of property nor entry into a dwelling,
the state had not delegated any public function to the warehouse22
man.
In contrast to Melara, the Eighth Circuit in Cox Bakeries, Inc. v.
Timm Moving & Storage, Inc." held that the warehouseman's consummated foreclosure sale constituted state action.2 4 The court
predicated its finding of state action on two bases. First, section 7210 was a recent statutory enactment20 which substantially altered
the common law. Second, by sanctioning the warehouseman's right
of sale, the state delegated to the creditor the public function of lien
execution.2 6 Having found state action, the court declared that when
a state authorizes a creditor to resolve legal disputes unilaterally,
the creditor's conduct must conform to the requirements of due
process.27
The court's state action analysis in Cox relied primarily on the
reasoning of the Second Circuit in Brooks v. Flagg Bros. 2 After
18. Id. See also Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 1974); Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974).
19. 541 F.2d at 808.
20. The state may employ various means to sanction private conduct. It may do so by
statute or judicial decision.
21. 541 F.2d at 804, 805-06. In addition, the court emphasized that the challenged statute had existed in some form for more than 120 years. Id. at 806.
22. Id. at 807-08. Cf. Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Hall v. Garson,
430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (seizure of property after entry into dwelling constitutes public
function).
Additional factors which the Melara court considered relevant to the state action issue
include: the contractual basis of the creditor-debtor relationship; lack of any "symbiotic
relationship" between the state and the creditor; and state regulation of the warehouse
industry. 541 F.2d at 806-07.
23. 554 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1977).
24. Id. at 359. In Cox, a dispute regarding storage charges arose between a bakery owner
and a warehouseman who stored the bakery equipment. The disagreement culminated in the
sale of the equipment.
25. The court noted that, in contrast to the situation in Melara, the challenged statute
has existed only since 1967. Id. at 358.
26. The court stressed that the state cast the warehouseman in "the traditional roles of
judge, jury and sheriff." Id.
27. Id. at 360. After intimating that the statute offends due process standards, the court
remanded the case for determination of that issue. Id. at 361.
28. 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1977).
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defaulting in rent payments, Shirley Brooks was evicted from her
apartment by a city marshal. A representative of the Flagg Brothers
moving and storage company accompanied the marshal to remove
the household furnishings."9 The company ultimately moved
although
Brooks's belongings from the apartment to its warehouse,
3
the voluntary nature of this transfer was controverted. 1
After a dispute over storage rates, Brooks refused to pay the total
amount requested by Flagg Brothers. 3' Flagg Brothers took steps to
foreclose its lien when attempts to resolve the disagreement failed.
The company sent Brooks a letter 3 demanding that she settle her
account within ten days, and informing her that failure to pay would
result in sale of her stored possessions.
To prevent the proposed sale, Brooks initiated a section 1983 class
action alleging that the section 7-210 foreclosure would deprive her
of property without due process of law. 33 The district court dismissed the case, holding that the proposed sale did not constitute
state action. 34 The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that the
29. The marshal's sole responsibility was to supervise the eviction of the tenant along
with her possessions. To effectuate the eviction, the marshal apparently had the authority
to contract with a private moving and storage company such as Flagg Brothers. Once the
tenant's goods were moved from the apartment to the sidewalk, the marshal's authority
terminated. See Petition for Certiorari, App. at 98a-99a. Cf. Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc.,
441 F. Supp. 872, 877 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (sheriff empowered by statute to store evicted tenant's
goods giving rise to warehouseman's lien).
30. According to Flagg Brothers, Brooks requested storage services upon learning that
her displaced belongings would remain on the sidewalk. Brooks, however, claimed that the
city marshal led her to believe that she had to store her possessions with Flagg Brothers.
553 F.2d at 766-67.
31. Brooks maintained that after taking possession, Flagg Brothers increased the original
storage rate and tacked on additional charges. Id. at 767.
32. This letter complied with the requirements of U.C.C. § 7-210. See note 9 supra.
33. The relief sought included money damages, an injunction, and a declaratory judgment that the threatened sale violates due process in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. 404 F. Supp. 1059, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Gloria Jones, who also had a very restricted
income and had been evicted for nonpayment of rent, joined as a second named plaintiff.
Unlike Brooks, however, Jones contended that she never expressly consented to the storage
of her goods by Flagg Brothers. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 63 F.R.D. 409, 412-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The suit originally named as defendants Flagg Brothers, Inc., the president of the company,
and the city marshal. Subsequently, additional defendants intervened: the Attorney General
of the State of New York, the American Warehousemen's Association, and other warehousemen's organizations. Id. at 414-16. Brooks later dismissed the city marshal from the suit,
leaving only private defendants. 553 F.2d at 768 n.6.
Originally Brooks alleged that Flagg Brothers conspired with the city marshal to obtain the
storage contract. Verified Complaint, reprinted in Petition for Certiorari, App. at 14a. Had
Brooks pursued this conspiracy argument, state action might have been easier to establish.
See Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (finding state action
on basis of "concert of action" between evicting sheriff and warehouseman).
34. In particular, the court determined that the warehouseman's conduct did not constitute state action under the theories of public function, state encouragement, or state regulation of the warehouse industry. 404 F. Supp. at 1062-66.
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state's involvement in the warehouseman's proposed sale fulfilled
the threshold requirement of state action.s This holding rested on
two theories: (1) state delegation of a governmental function to the
warehouseman, and (2) substantial expansion of the warehouseman's common law rights. This affirmative finding of state action
stood in direct opposition to Melara, even though both cases involved an identical statutory provision and indistinguishable facts.3
To resolve this conflict as well as to address the "important question" of when private conduct constitutes state action, the United
37
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
ELEMENTS OF A SECTION

1983 ACTION

The Court began its analysis by differentiating the two components of a section 1983 action: (1) violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or federal law, and (2) action "under color of' state
law. Without defining either element, the Court attempted to articulate "the essential distinction" between these components.
To clarify this difference, the Court focused on the nature of the
constitutional right, the violation of which comprises the first element. The Constitution safeguards some rights against both governmental and private interference. 9 Most rights, though, including
due process, are protected from only governmental violation. To
vindicate rights in the first category, a claimant need only demonstrate that an infringement occurred.' 0 Proof of state action is not
required to establish a constitutional violation. To redress infringements of rights shielded from only governmental intrusion, however,
the aggrieved party must establish both that an infringement occurred and that it constituted state action."
35. 553 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1977).
36. The court acknowledged this disparty but was "unpersuaded" by Melara's state action analysis. Id. at 774. In each case, the debtor alleged that U.C.C. § 7-210, by empowering
the warehouseman to sell the stored goods unilaterally, contravened due process under the
fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, each debtor challenged the amount of storage charges
demanded by the moving and storage company.
37. 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). The conflict regarding state action was not confined to the
circuit courts; district courts also reached differing conclusions. Compar Wegwart v. Eagle
Movers, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (finding state action) and Smith v. Bekins
Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (finding no state action) with Magro
v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage, 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 460 F.2d
1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972) (leaving state action issue unresolved).
38. 436 U.S. at 156.
39. An example of such a right is the thirteenth amendment right to be free from slavery
or involuntary servitude. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-39 (1968).
40. 436 U.S. at 156.
41. Id. at 155.
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Whichever class of rights a party asserts, he must satisfy the
second element of a section 1983 action by establishing that the
violation occurred under color of state law. Thus when the right at
issue is protected only from governmental interference,4 2 there must
be both state action and action under color of law.
The relevance of this bifurcated requirement depends on whether
a public official or a private party committed the alleged
"governmental intrusion." Where a state official causes or sanctions 3 a deprivation of property, for instance, state action and action under color of state law merge, and both are satisfied." The
difference between the two concepts, therefore, should not affect
section 1983 suits involving direct participation by government officials. The distinction becomes important in cases where no public
official acts directly. Here, the two concepts of state action and
under color of state law do not merge. Private conduct is attributable to government only when both requirements are satisfied. 5
Mere statutory authorization for a private deprivation of property
should meet the under color of law requirement. However, the additional burden" of proving a distinct state action element may frustrate section 1983 suits challenging deprivations by private creditors.
After asserting the need to meet both criteria in Flagg, the Court
peremptorily dismissed the under color of law inquiry and focused
instead on the more stringent requirement of state action. Section
7-210 clearly authorized Flagg Brothers to sell the stored goods. This
authorization presumably satisfied the under color of state law component. 7 Resolution of the case thus hinged on whether the pro42. Due process falls within this category. To prove a violation of due process, therefore,
both state action and action under color of state law must be shown.
43. Where a sheriff actually levies on a debtor's goods, the state official causes the deprivation. See, e.g., Funtes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 37 (1972). Where a judge or court clerk issues
a writ authorizing the seizure of a debtor's property, the state official sanctions the taking.
See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
44. 436 U.S. at 157 n.5.
45. Id. at 157.
46. Prior to Flagg, courts generally regarded action under color of state law as equivalent
to state action. "In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as
the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794-95 n.7 (1966) (emphasis added). Moreover, one court
considered under color of state law to be a more stringent requirement than state action.
Hagopian v. Consolidated Equities Corp., 397 F. Supp. 934, 936 (N.D. Ga. 1975). In Flagg
the Court announced that the two concepts are analytically distinct and that an affirmative
finding of conduct under color of state law no longer suffices to establish state action. 436
U.S. at 156. But see Ruffler v. Phelps Memorial Hosp., 453 F. Supp. 1062, 1067 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (cited Flagg but stated that under color of law and state action are equivalent).
47. The Court, however, never specifically resolved whether under color of state law re-
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posed sale by the private warehouseman constituted state action.
Accordingly, the Court examined two doctrines of state action
whereby the sale might be attributed to the State: public function"
and state encouragement. 4'
STATE ACTION

The Public Function Doctrine
The public function doctrine provides that when the state delegates a governmental power to a private entity, that party becomes
an extension of the sovereign and is subject to the same constitutional constraints as states ° Prior to Flagg, courts generally designated a function as governmental in nature where it was
traditionally associated with the sovereign.' Relying upon Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,1 2 the Flagg Court construed the public
function doctrine more restrictively. Under the Court's interpretation, the public function doctrine applies only where the private
entity exercises "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
quires more than private action taken with knowledge of and pursuant to state statute. 436
U.S. at 156. See note 3 supra.
48. The public function doctrine is alternatively referred to as the sovereign, state, or
governmental function doctrine. The doctrine originated in the White Primary Cases: Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon,
286 U.S. 73 (1932); and the "company town" case, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
For a discussion of the extension of Marsh to "shopping center cases," and Marsh's subsequent limitation, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513-21 (1976).
49. This theory arose in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
50. The basic theory underlying the doctrine was enunciated in Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296, 299 (1966):
Conduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to
the constitutional limitations placed upon state action . . . .We have also held
that . . . when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers
or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of
the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.
Justice Harlan criticized the public function doctrine in his dissent:
It substitutes for the comparatively clear and concrete test of state action a catchphrase approach as vague and amorphous as it is far-reaching. It dispenses with
the sound and careful principles of past decisions in this realm. And it carries the
seeds of transferring to federal authority vast areas of concern whose regulation has
wisely been left by the Constitution to the States.
Id. at 322.
51. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (maintenance of municipal park
constituted traditional public function); Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 433 (9th Cir.
1975) (Ely, C.J., concurring) (power to seize property traditionally reposed in state officers);
Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1970) (execution of lien equalled traditional
function of the sheriff).
52. 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no state action where privately-owned utility terminates debtor's
service).
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State." 53 The Court concluded that a section 7-210 sale does not
meet this exclusivity test. 4 In focusing on exclusivity, the Court did
not adequately examine two bases whereby the sale could have been
characterized as a public function: binding conflict resolution 5 and
lien enforcement.56
53. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). Under the Flagg Court's narrow construction, only two
categories of private activity fulfill this two-fold "traditionally exclusive" requirement: primary elections and the operation of a company town. 436 U.S. at 163. See note 48 supra. In
discussing public function cases, the Court did not acknowledge that Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966), established the maintenance of a city park as a public function. The Court,
however, did intimate that a third category might qualify under this test: the private exercise
of traditional police functions. 436 U.S. at 163 n.14.
54. The Court contrasted the warehouseman's sale with previously recognized public
functions:
Although the elections held by the Democratic Party and its affiliates were the only
meaningful elections in Texas, and the streets owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corp. were the only streets in Chickasaw, the proposed sale by Flagg Brothers under
§ 7-210 is not the only means of resolving this purely private dispute.
Id. at 159-60.
55. The concept of binding conflict resolution as a function of the sovereign derives from
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held that in the context of
divorce proceedings, dispute resolution constituted a public function because judicial
"process [was] not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only
available one." Id. at 377. Chief Judge Kaufman, dissenting in both Shirley v. State Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) and Bond v. Dentzer,
494 F.2d 302, 312 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974), advocated extending Boddie's
holding to creditor-debtor cases. Justice Stevens espoused this view in his dissent to Flagg.
436 U.S. at 178-79 n.17.
Flagg Brothers argued that Boddie applies only where the sole means of resolving disputes
is through an instrumentality of the state. Two private parties cannot terminate their marriage contract without resort to judicial process; commercial disputes, however, may be
resolved without judicial interference. Brief for Petitioner Flagg Brothers at 13.
56. Courts have characterized lien enforcement as a traditional public function. See, e.g.,
Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 434 (9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, J., concurring) (innkeeper's
lien); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970) (landlord's lien); Blye v. Globe-Wemicke
Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 300 N.E.2d 710 (1973) (finding by New York's
highest court that enforcement of innkeeper's lien is public function). Cf. Parks v. "Mr.
Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 141 (3d Cir. 1977) (retention of property under garageman's lien not
public function, but foreclosure sale is public function); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l
Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975) (retention of property under hotelkeeper's lien not public
function).
At common law, when a bailee had a possessory lien, he could retain the bailed chattels
until the debt was paid. Yet he had no right to sell unless afforded such a right by express
contractual agreement or by statute. In addition, a bailee who wanted to foreclose a possessory lien by selling the chattels had to obtain a judgment against the bailor. Disposing of
chattels without resort to judicial process constituted conversion. Moreover, the sheriff, not
the bailee, executed the judgment against the bailor by selling the goods. See Brief for
Respondents at 23-25; Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764, 771-72 (2d Cir. 1977).
But see Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), where the court
declared: "[EIxecution on goods lawfully in a warehouseman's possession, to satisfy charges
arising out of such possession, is not traditionally a function of the sheriff." (emphasis in
original).
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1. Binding Conflict Resolution

The Court rejected the contention that section 7-210 delegates to
the warehouseman the public function of final nonconsensual dispute resolution. By authorizing the warehouseman to sell his customer's goods to recover storage costs, the state grants him the
power of settling a private commercial dispute. Yet the Court noted
that the foreclosure sale is not the exclusive means of resolving the
conflict.5 7 The Court observed that prior to entrusting her goods to
Flagg Brothers, Brooks could have negotiated a waiver" of the warehouseman's statutory right of sale. Further, if the storage is unauthorized, a debtor may seek to replevy his possessions." Additionally, section 7-210 allows recovery against a warehouseman who
violates the statute's mandatory procedures.16
A major weakness in the Court's reasoning stems from its failure
to consider whether the suggested alternatives are in fact
"available" to debtors such as Brooks. The obvious inequality of
bargaining power between Flagg Brothers and Brooks would probably have prevented her from securing a waiver of the right of sale.
To institute a replevin action, moreover, a debtor must post, at a
minimum, a double bond." When the debtor is economically disadvantaged, procurement of this bond is virtually impossible. 2 Finally, the damage remedy in 7-210 applies only to violations of the
section's provisions. In Flagg, however, Brooks did not allege a deviation from the statutory procedures;"3 she attacked the statute
itself. Consequently, the damage remedy offered by section 7-210 is
irrelevant. Despite the dubious availability of these alternatives, the
Court attached much significance to their mere existence.
From the presence of these remedies, the Court inferred that dispute settlement between creditors and debtors is not traditionally
an exclusive state prerogative. 4 This conclusion suffers from a basic
57. 436 U.S. at 160.
58. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) provides in relevant part: "The effect of provisions of this Act
may be varied by agreement ....
"
59. 436 U.S. at 160, citing N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§ 7101-7112 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
60. U.C.C. § 7-210(9).
61. To comply with the double bond requirement, the debtor must furnish security in at
least twice the value of the goods involved. See 436 U.S. at 166 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. The debtor could possibly file in forma pauperis and thus avoid this requirement.
63. Brooks initially contested the validity of the warehouseman's lien under U.C.C. § 7209(1). The section provides in relevant part: "A warehouseman has a lien against the bailor
on the goods covered by a warehouse receipt . . . for charges for storage or transportation
.
... This issue was not raised before the Supreme Court. See Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553
F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1977); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 151 (1978).
64. Id. at 161.
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analytical defect. The state has discretion to fashion various methods of resolving commercial disputes. Nevertheless, the state's
power to resolve disputes may be exclusive, regardless of the method
chosen to exercise it.5 Because of its emphasis on methods rather
than power, the Court never fully addressed the issue of binding,
nonconsensual dispute settlement. The debtors in Flagg urged that
a warehouseman exercises a public function in a 7-210 sale because
the statute delegates to him a portion of the "state's monopoly over
techniques for binding conflict resolution." 6 The statute empowers
a warehouseman to determine both the existence and amount of a
debt, and to sell property in satisfaction of that debt. The creditor
may sell stored goods even where the debtor objects." To aggravate
this nonconsensual aspect, the sale may finally terminate the
debtor's property interest." Thus the warehouseman exercises over
the debtor powers of both judgment and execution. The Court, however, circumvented analysis of.the sale as a binding nonconsensual
method of settlement by refusing to acknowledge the power to resolve commercial disputes as a public function.
65. In dissent, Justice Stevens highlighted this conceptual incongruity. He maintained
that the availability of alternate remedies is relevant to the issue of due process rather than
to the state action question.
As I understand the Court's notion of "exclusivity," the sovereign function here is
not exclusive because there may be other state remedies, under different statutes
or common-law theories, available to respondents. Ante, at 159-160. Even if I were
to accept the notion that sovereign functions must be "exclusive," the Court's
description of exclusivity is incomprehensible. The question is whether a particular
action is a uniquely sovereign function, not whether state law forecloses any possibility of recovering for damages for such activity.
Id. at 172-73 n.8.
The question of exclusivity should pertain to the analysis of both state action and due
process. Under state action, the inquiry should be whether the power derives exclusively from
the sovereign. Whether the conduct at issue is the only means of exercising that power affects
what process is due.
66. Brief for Respondents at 26 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971)).
But see Brief for Petitioner Flagg Brothers at 13. See also note 55 supra.
67. Although U.C.C. § 7-210 does not explicitly authorize the warehouseman to sell the
stored goods over the debtor's objection, the statute also does not contain any clause requiring
the debtor's consent to the sale. The only provision within the statute for preventing the
foreclosure sale is subsection (3), which prohibits the sale if the debtor pays "the amount
necessary to satisfy the lien and the reasonable expenses incurred under this section." Cf.
Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071, 1073-74 (7th Cir. 1978) (debtor's filing of notarized affidavit
of defense compels creditor to obtain judicial validation of his lien). In practice, most New
York warehouseman's contracts contain provisions allowing sale in case of default. See Brooks
v. Flagg Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059, 1065 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). If the debtor signs such a
contract, arguably he consents to the sale. Flagg's holding, however, does not rest on whether
such contract existed. 436 U.S. at 169 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. A bona fide purchaser of the foreclosed goods takes free of any rights of the debtor
against whom the lien was valid. U.C.C. § 7-210(5). The provision is silent regarding the
consequences of foreclosure on an invalid lien.
69. Lower courts had previously rejected the concept of binding conflict resolution in the
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2. Lien Enforcement
Although the circuit court advanced lien enforcement as an alternate ground for finding a public function, 0 the Supreme Court virtually ignored the concept. At common law, only the sheriff could
execute a lien.7 The debtor thus contended that through enactment
of section 7-210 the state delegated the sheriff's traditional role to
2
the private warehouseman.1

The Court could have utilized two factors in determining whether
a particular function is "traditionally" public: the origin of the
function-whether it developed by common law or by statute; and
age-the period of time during which private parties have performed the particular function. The opinion cursorily dismissed the
historical origin of the warehouseman's foreclosure sale as irrelevant. The Court correctly reasoned that the origin of the right of sale
does not decide the state action issue." When a state sanctions a
practice, it assumes responsibility for that practice, whether
adopted by statute or by common law. The Court also based its
rejection of "historical antecedents" 7 on the inconsistent holdings
in Melara75 and Cox." However, in those cases the right of sale was
statutorily created, so that origin could not account for the conflicting holdings.
The disparity in result derived from the substantial discrepancy
in the ages of the challenged statutes.77 The Court's disapproval of
the contradictory results in Melara and Cox apparently discards age
as immaterial. Since the Court found neither origin nor age relevant, it should have identified what factors denote a "traditional"
commercial sector as a public function. See, e.g., Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201, 205 (1st
Cir. 1975); Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166, 1173 (5th Cir. 1975); Gibbs
v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub noa. Gibbs v. Garver, 419 U.S.
1039 (1974).
70. 553 F.2d 764, 771 (2d Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 772. See note 56 supra. See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 121 at 602-03 (2d ed. 1955).
72. Brief for Respondents at 21.
73. "Our analysis requires no parsing of the difference between various commercial
liens and other remedies to support the conclusion that this entire field of activity is outside
the scope of [the public function doctrine]. This is true whether these commercial rights
and remedies are created by statute or decisional law." 436 U.S. at 162.
74. Id. at 162-63.
75. Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
76. Cox Bakeries, Inc. v. Timm Moving & Storage Co., 554 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1977).
77. The statutory right of sale has existed in California for over 120 years. Melara v.
Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1976). In contrast, North Dakota enacted the statute
authorizing the warehouseman's sale in 1967. Cox Bakeries, Inc. v. Timm Moving & Storage
Co., 554 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1977).
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the Court's
public function. Without an alternative to age or7origin,
'8
vacuum.
"historical
an
in
test must be applied

The Court's concern with the Melara-Cox dichotomy reflects a
valid desire to avoid divergent outcomes where the constitutionality
of a uniform statute is at issue. Yet under the Court's public function test, inconsistency cannot be avoided. Whenever courts must
look to the "traditional" 9 nature of a practice, results will vary
according to each state's history. Uniformity can be achieved in the
context of the warehouseman's sale only by invoking early English
common law, under which the sheriff conducted all foreclosure
sales. If the Court in Flagg had looked to common law, the warehouseman's conduct would qualify as a traditional, exclusive public
function. The Flagg Court, however, declined to rely on early common law to obviate potentially disparate results.80
The Court's failure to at least consider early common law, combined with its fear of inconsistent results, leads to an anomaly with
regard to the public function test. The Court will find a public
function when a private entity exercises "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." Neither English common law nor more
recent historical antecedents, however, may be used to determine
whether lien enforcement is traditionally an exclusive state prerogative.
3. Absence Of Force
In rejecting the doctrine of public function, the Court further
relied on the absence of any statutory authorization for the use or
threat of force. 81 Under lien enforcement, the debtor argued that the
sale itself constituted a public function because the sheriff traditionally executed liens.82 Yet the sheriffs traditional role may not
Justice Marshall disapproved of the Court's approach:
I am also troubled by the Court's cavalier treatment of the place of historical factors
in the "state action" inquiry. While we are, of course, not bound by what occurred
centuries ago in England, the test adopted by the Court itself requires us to decide
what functions have been "traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." Such
an issue plainly cannot be resolved in a historical vacuum. New York's highest court
has stated that "[in [New York] the execution of a lien . . . traditionally has
been the function of the Sheriff." Numerous other courts, in New York and elsewhere, have reached a similar conclusion.
436 U.S. at 167-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
79. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
80. "[W]e are disinclined to decide the issue of state involvement on the basis of
whether a particular class of creditor did or did not enjoy the same freedom to act in Elizabethan or Georgian England." 436 U.S. at 163 n.13 (citing Davis v. Richmond, 512 F.2d 201,
203 (1st Cir. 1975)).
81. 436 U.S. at 160 n.9.
82. Brief for Respondents at 21.
78.
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have been as much supervision of the foreclosure sale as it was the
use or threat of force when a debtor opposed the sale.8 Similarly,
in examining binding conflict resolution, the Court intimated that
a crucial distinction exists between nonconsensual dispute resolution in general, and that which is implemented by the threat or use
of force.
An exchange between the majority and dissenting justices reveals
the relevance of a private use of force in the public function analysis.
In dissent, Justice Stevens hypothesized that Flagg's holding precludes a court from finding state action even where the state authorizes any individual "with sufficient physical power" to appropriate
the property of a weaker neighbor." The majority countered this
apprehension by emphasizing that section 7-210 "does not involve
state authorization of private breach of the peace." 5 The Court
further distinguished the warehouseman's power to sell property
legally within his possession 8 and the "power to order legally binding surrenders of property.""7 The warehouseman already in possession does not "order" his debtor to "surrender" anything; therefore,
he has no need to use or threaten force. The majority's comments
implied that statutory authorization of the use or threat of force is
a significant factor when applying the public function doctrine to
creditor-debtor controversies. Accordingly, had section 7-210 authorized an actual seizure of the debtor's goods, or sanctioned
breach of the peace, the Court might have decided the state action
issue differently.
83. The Attorney General for the State of New York advanced this argument. Brief for
Petitioner Attorney General Lefkowitz at 12. See Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426, 433-34
(9th Cir. 1975) (Ely, C.J., concurring). Cf. Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750,
463 P.2d 651 (1970) (found "constructive force" where sheriff accompanied creditor employing self-help repossession).
84. 436 U.S. at 170 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 160 n.9. In this respect, the statute at issue in Flagg differs markedly from that
involved in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). In Hall, the challenged statute
authorized a landlord to enforce his lien for unpaid rent by entering the tenant's apartment
and peremptorily seizing any of the tenant's personal belongings. Id. at 432-33. When such
entry, and seizure lacks the tenant's consent it is a breach of the peace. In Anastasia v.
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), however, the court rejected the
creditor's "unauthorized entry" as a basis for finding a public function.
The warehouseman's sale is analogous to self-help repossession, which also does not involve
a breach of the peace. In James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), the court distinguished
self-help repossession from a "roving commission" to satisfy a debt through entry and seizure.
Id. at 208.
86. The warehouseman, of course, has no authority to take any property which the debtor
has not previously placed in storage.
87. 436 U.S. at 161-62 n.11.
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State Action Through Encouragement
The Court next examined whether New York encouraged the proposed sale sufficiently to justify attributing the warehouseman's
conduct to the state. The debtor argued that by affording the creditor an expeditious and inexpensive means of foreclosing his lien, the
state in effect encouraged the creditor to choose this method. 8 The
Court's analysis reiterated that a statute which permits but does not
compel a practice does not supply the requisite state action. 8
The State does not compel the warehouseman to foreclose his lien
unilaterally; neither does it prevent or punish him for adopting such
conduct. The Court correctly identified the crux of the debtor's
complaint as whether this state inaction qualifies as encouragement.9 0 The Flagg Court engaged in faulty reasoning in rejecting
state inaction as a basis for encouragement." First the Court characterized section 7-210 as a statutory refusal to intervene in a private
88.

The debtor submitted that:
[Bly authorizing the summary sale of goods, section 7-210 has granted warehousemen a power which, from their standpoint, is an economically and strategically
attractive alternative to either commencing an action for monetary damages, proving a claim and obtaining and enforcing a judgment, or obtaining judicial foreclosure on the lien ....
Brief for Respondents at 33. Cf. Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594
(E.D. Mich. 1974), rev'd 527 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1975), where the district court found that the
statute authorizing extra-judicial mortgage foreclosures significantly encouraged their use. Of
approximately 8,600 mortgage foreclosures in 1972, only 52 were judicial. Id. at 597.
89. 436 U.S. at 165. The Court cited Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) to support the
proposition that mere acquiescence by the state does not convert private conduct into state
action. But cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Reitman decision set forth the
principle that the mere existence of a statute might constitute state action where it has
sufficient impact on private conduct. Yet this principle has been limited to situations involving racial discrimination. See note 110 infra. The encouragement theory of state action has
not escaped criticism. "By focusing on 'encouragement' the Court, I fear, is forging a slippery
and unfortunate criterion by which to measure the constitutionality of a statute.
Reitman, 387 U.S. at 393 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. 436 U.S. at 166. Commentators have theorized that a state's inaction may operate as
an affirmative act.
It should be clear that a state may be connected to the asserted deprivation by its
tolerance of the challenged practice as well as by its positive acts. To illustrate,
assuming that a right to do something is protected by "due process," how may a
state "deprive any person" of that right? Obviously it could do so in three formally
different but substantively similar ways . . . . Third, observing that absent laws
to the contrary, a practice of some nongovernmental persons will exist in a form
which limits or eliminates the right, the state could do nothing. Despite traditional
theory it seems hard to contend that the state has done less "depriving" of the right
in the third alternative.
Glennon & Nowak, supra note 6, at 229 (emphasis added).
91. 436 U.S. at 164-66. It is unclear whether the Court's holding that state inaction does
not equal state encouragement is limited to a commercial setting or applies to racial discrimination as well.

19791

State Action

warehouseman's sale.2 The Court then equated this statutory refusal with denial of judicial relief, finding it immaterial which of
these forms state inaction assumes. 3 Finally, the Court expressed
concern that if mere denial of judicial relief were sufficient encouragement for state action, the distinction between "private" and
"public" would be obliterated."
The initial flaw in this analysis of state inaction lies in the Court's
presumption that the state can remain truly "neutral" 5 in the face
of allegedly objectionable conduct. This presupposition slights a
crucial factor: the state cannot not decide. When the state is confronted with a challenge to allegedly improper conduct, it must
"act" whether by legislative fiat or judicial decision. Failure to respond when so confronted would constitute an affirmation of the
status quo; thus the state would no longer be neutral.
A further deficiency is the Court's assertion that the form of state
inaction is irrelevant to the encouragement inquiry. The Court
correctly reasoned that even in the absence of statutory authorization the first time the aggrieved debtor challenged the sale in court,
the state would have to act by judicial decision. 8 This reasoning,
however, begs the question whether a warehouseman would even
contemplate summarily selling the debtor's property absent express
statutory authorization. 9 Thus by legislatively "refusing to intervene," the state may have initiated and thereby encouraged a practice which might not otherwise have arisen.
Furthermore, judicial action may be ambiguous. Since a court
may deny relief for a variety of reasons, 00 the mere fact that a debtor
fails to recover does not necessarily mean that the state sanctions
the challenged conduct. In contrast, by enacting a statute that allows a particular practice, the state clearly condones that practice.
92. Id. at 165.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. In theory, a state can be neutral. In some circumstances, however, a state's theoretical "neutrality" may actually be a form of bias. The state may refuse to intervene because
of a bias favoring the persons whose conduct is challenged, or a disinclination to aid the
complaining parties.
96. The Court itself indirectly acknowledged this. 436 U.S. at 165.
97. The Court observed that it is "immaterial that the State has embodied its decision
not to act in statutory form." Id.
98. Id.
99. Compare Brooks v. Flagg Bro., Inc., 553 F.2d 764, 772 (2d Cir. 1977) (absent statutory authorization, creditor could not fgreclose lien) with Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d
607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974) (absent statute, creditor could still employ self-help repossession).
100. Grounds for denying relief which do not go to the merits of the case include statutes
of limitations, failure of process, and want of prosecution.
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For these reasons, a statute explicitly creating the right of sale constitutes greater state encouragement than mere denial of judicial
relief after the sale has occurred. Thus, failure to differentiate between forms of state inaction may be conceptually inadequate.
The Court's effort to buttress its claim that a statutory refusal to
act equals a judicial denial of relief disclosed an additional infirmity. The Court reasoned that section 7-210 is "no different in principle from an ordinary statute of limitations.''0 This analogy, however, is inapposite. Policy considerations giving rise to a statute of
limitations are totally distinct from those underlying the doctrine
of state action. A statute of limitations embodies principles of finality and repose 02 which are irrelevant to state action. In contrast, the
doctrine of state action comprises principles "quasi-jurisdictional"
in nature. 03 The sole commonality between a statute of limitations
and state action is that both may bar judicial review of the substantive claim for relief. Due to the overriding differences between the
two concepts, the Court's reliance on this comparison is misplaced.
Finally, the Court's concern that finding encouragement in the
mere denial of judicial relief would contravene the "essential dichotomy"'0 4 between private and public conduct lacks merit. Under this
dichotomy,0 5 governmental activities must conform to the strictures
of the fourteenth amendment while purely private conduct escapes
these constraints. It is questionable whether this dichotomy retains
any validity. 06 However marginal, state involvement pervades almost every aspect of modern society, thus leaving few purely private
activities. 07 Even assuming this dichotomy has validity, denial of
101. 436 U.S. at 166.
102. "Statutes of limitations are designed to insure fairness to defendants by preventing
the revival of stale claims in which the defense is hampered by lost evidence, faded memories, and disappearing witnesses, and to avoid unfair surprise." Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 473 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. State action is "quasi-jurisdictional" in the sense that absent a finding of state
action, the Court lacks jurisdiction to render a decision on the merits of the constitutional
challenge. See Comment, State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure, 64 CAL. L. REV.
146, 155 (1976). Cf. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 n.23 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974) (observing that state action issue requires
some consideration of substantive matters).
104. 436 U.S. at 165 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349
(1974)). The dichotomy contrasts state deprivations of guaranteed rights, which the fourteenth amendment prohibits, and private conduct, against which the amendment offers no
protection.
105. This dichotomy originated in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
106. 436 U.S. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Braden v. University of Pittsburgh,
552 F.2d 948, 956 (3d Cir. 1977) (relating difficulties inherent in separating government and
private sectors).
107. Governmental funding, whether state or federal, supports many private institutions,
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judicial relief does not always amount to the state authorization
necessary to transform a private taking into a public deprivation of
property.
In discarding statutory authorization as a basis for state action,
the Court did not articulate what level of state involvement would
amount to encouragement. Additionally, the overall deficiencies in
the Court's analysis weaken its resolution of the encouragement
question.
Two-TIERED STATE ACTION ANALYSIS

The Flagg Court's failure to find state action clearly reflects a
restrictive interpretation of public function and state encouragement. Yet the Court cautioned that its holding does not impair the
precedential value of state action decisions arising in the context of
racial discrimination. 08 By differentiating these cases, the Court
implicitly endorsed the premise that standards of state action may
vary according to the right allegedly abridged. 0° Under this approach, racial discrimination cases require a lower level of state
involvement than debtor-creditor disputes. This variation reflects
differing federal priorities. The judiciary's desire to eradicate racial
discrimination prompted a liberal interpretation of state action.""
In contrast, the more restrictive application of state action in the
creditor-debtor context derived from a concern for creditors'
rights."'
such as schools and hospitals.
There are, however, some areas of conduct which are so private that constitutional prohibitions should not apply. See Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist
Theory and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1, 25-27
[hereinafter cited as Thompson].
108. 436 U.S. at 163.
109. Several courts have endorsed a "sliding scale" approach to state action. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 635 (2d Cir. 1974); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d
206, 209 (5th Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). The Court of Appeals in Flagg found state
action even though it adopted this sliding scale analysis: "[Tihe criteria for finding state
action in equal protection cases involving charges of racial discrimination are easier to meet
than those formulated in cases such as that at bar." Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 767, 770
(2d Cir. 1977).
110. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
111. In a line of cases beginning with Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court formulated due process standards for
creditors' remedies which served to expand debtors' rights. Judge Gibbons, concurring in
Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 149-51 (3d Cir. 1977), suggests that the doctrine of state
action was borrowed from discrimination cases and applied to cases involving debtor-creditor
disputes in an attempt to counterbalance this growing judicial preference for debtors' rights.
Those courts seeking to limit the effect of Sniadach and its progeny relied on footnote 12
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By apparently adopting this two-tiered standard, the Flagg Court
renders it difficult to establish state action in constitutional challenges to creditor remedies. The Court's refusal to construe the encouragement doctrine expansively in a commercial setting comports
with the tendency of lower federal courts to limit its application to
racial cases."' Further, the Court has previously restricted the
theory's scope even within the area of race discrimination." 3 In contrast, failure to extend the public function doctrine to creditor remedies is more questionable. Unlike state encouragement, this theory
has been applied outside the racial arena."4 Precedent exists, moreover, for using public function analysis specifically in debtorcreditor controversies."
DUE PROCESS

The Court's restrictive view of state action produces an anomalous result. In prior cases delineating due process standards for creditor remedies, lack of adequate state supervision of the challenged
procedure violated due process." 6 After Flagg, lack of state control
of Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 79 n.12, which provided: "The creditor could, of course, proceed
without the use of state power, through self-help ....
" In several self-help repossession
cases, "without the use of state power" was construed to signify no state action. See, e.g.,
Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Garver, 419 U.S.
1039 (1974); McDuffy v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1974);
Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973). Contra, Boland v. Essex
County Bank & Trust Co., 361 F. Supp. 917, 921 (D. Mass. 1973) (found state action after
determining that reliance on footnote 12 was misplaced). In Flagg, the warehouseman apparently relied on footnote 12 to support his assertion that creditors' self-help remedies do not
constitute state action. Reply Brief for Petitioner Flagg Brothers at 8 n.5.
112. See, e.g., Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 1977); Northrip v. Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1975); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208-09
(5th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974); Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 333 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974).
113. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970).
114. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (first amendment violation alleged).
115. Lower courts have found lien enforcement to be a public function. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
116. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601,607 (1975); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972). Cf. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614-16 (1974)
(sufficient state supervision). See generally Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's
Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 RuTrERs
L. REV. 541 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Catz & Robinson]. The Flagg Court distinguished
these cases by maintaining that each involved "overt official involvement." 436 U.S. at 157.
The official involvement in at least some of these cases, however, was limited to purely
ministerial acts by minor public officials. As Justice Stevens emphasized in his dissent, such
involvement has been held insufficient to constitute state action. Id. at 173-74. See, e.g.,
Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132, 148 (3d Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring); Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1113 n.17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Garver, 419 U.S.

19791

State Action

refutes the existence of state action. Thus, the very factor that previously rendered creditor remedies unconstitutional under a due
process analysis now precludes constitutional review of section 7210."11 As a result of Flagg, a low level of state involvement constitutes state action, but contravenes due process guarantees. A
slightly lower level of state involvement, however, negates state
action, and thus obviates further judicial scrutiny.
Had the Court undertaken a due process analysis of section 7-210,
it would have considered whether the statute satisfied the minimum
procedural safeguards of notice"' and opportunity to be heard."'
Although section 7-210 clearly prescribes notice to the debtor'2" the
statute does not expressly afford any hearing. Consequently, section
7-210 may exceed the permissible bounds of due process.
In Flagg, the warehouseman argued that even though section 7210 does not explicitly mandate a hearing, it supplies adequate
procedural safeguards.' 2 ' After receiving notice, the debtor has at
least twenty days in which to redeem his goods or challenge the
sale. 22 The creditor contended that during this period the debtor,
by initiating suit, may obtain a hearing on the merits of any defense
to the lien foreclosure. 23 Yet two considerations weaken the creditor's argument. First, requiring the debtor to commence suit to
secure a hearing places the burden of defeating the creditor's claim
1039 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 743 n.5 (2d Cir. 1974). Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit in Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071, 1077 (7th Cir. 1978), recently held that
the "minor involvement" of a state official acting in a purely ministerial capacity did not
constitute state action.
117. 436 U.S. at 173-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Notice must be "reasonably calculated ... to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
119. The hearing required by due process "must be granted at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). The type of hearing may
vary depending on the circumstances; a hearing before a judge is not always necessary. See
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 (1978). Apparently the timing of
the hearing is also variable. Although Fuentes required a hearing "at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented," 407 U.S. at 81, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974), the Court held that due process may be satisfied without a prior hearing if there are
adequate alternative procedural safeguards, including an immediate post-seizure hearing.
See generally Catz & Robinson, supra note 116.
120. U.C.C. § 7-210(2)(a)-(c).
121. Such protections include: the notice requirement; the delay between notice and sale
which gives the debtor time to redeem his goods; the requirement that the sale be held at
the nearest suitable place to avoid transportation costs; the surplus realized on sale going to
the debtor; and the damage liability for the warehouseman's failure to comply with the
section. See note 9 supra.
122. U.C.C. § 7-210(2)(f).
123. Brief for Petitioner Attorney General Lefkowitz at 21.
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on the debtor. Agruably, since it is the creditor who seeks to deprive
the debtor of property, it is he who should carry the burden of
proving his claim. Whether this shift in the burden of proof is consonant with due process has not been resolved. 2 ' Second, states often
require debtors to post bond prior to suit.'25 As a practical matter,
many debtors are unable to post sufficient security. Whether the
Constitution permits denial of the debtor's right to a hearing solely
2
because he is economically disadvantaged also remains unsettled. 1
Because the Court disposed of Flagg on the state action issue it
never addressed these important due process questions. Had the
Court found state action, it might also have discovered a due process violation.' But by finding no state action, the Court circumvented any due process analysis and thus absolved the creditor from
complying with procedural safeguards. 12 A major ramification of
the Flagg decision is that its state action analysis operates to curtail
29
federal due process scrutiny of self-help creditor remedies.
124. Several courts have held that placing the burden on the debtor violates due process.
See, e.g., Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977); Stypmann v. City of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
Contra, Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975). In
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court noted that the burden of proof at
the post-seizure hearing was on the creditor. Id. at 618. This factor apparently influenced the
Court's decision to uphold Louisiana's sequestration statute in the face of a due process
attack.
125. 436 U.S. at 166-67 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126. Compare Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce cannot be conditioned
on filing fee) with United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (voluntary bankruptcy may be
contingent on filing fee). Compare Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.
1975) (prejudgment attachment violated due process where debtor must post bond to obtain
a hearing) with Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975) (court
did not address due process, merely noting that debtor could obtain hearing through repleviri
action, despite bond requirement).
127. Cf. Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169 (1978)
(found violation of due process under state constitution which did not require state action
in a case involving an analogous foreclosure sale). But cf. Wegwart v. Eagle Movers, Inc., 441
F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (no violation of due process in 7-210 sale).
128. The Court may thus have reinforced the creditor's rights at the expense of the
debtor. Brooks contended that U.C.C. § 7-210 favors warehouseman as a "special interest
group." Brief for Respondents at 30-31. Flagg Brothers, however, characterized the provision as a "consumer-oriented statute beset with pitfalls for the warehouseman who elects
to use it." Brief for Petitioner Flagg Brothers at 27-28.
129. Although Justice Stevens expressed apprehension that Flagg'sholding will preclude
due process scrutiny of creditor remedies even in state courts, 436 U.S. at 177 n.15, the result
in Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169 (1978) indicates
otherwise. In Sharrock, New York's highest state court held that the state's Lien Law, which
empowered a garageman to sell unilaterally a bailed automobile, violated the due process
clause of the state constitution. The court reached this conclusion after determining that, in
light of Flagg, the lack of state action in the sale precluded review under the due process
clause of the United States Constitution.
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OTHER CREDITOR REMEDIES

The issue of state action will not foreclose due process inquiry in
all categories of creditor remedies. For example, when an officer of
the state directly participates in the taking of a debtor's property,
state action clearly exists. When, however, the creditor proceeds
against the debtor without any overt state assistance, state action
is more difficult to assess.
In several categories of creditor remedies, the state action question may bar judicial review of due process.13 0 One category is that
of self-help repossession under the UCC.13 ' Such repossession arguably exhibits greater indicia of state action than foreclosure of a
warehouseman's lien, because repossession requires a seizure of
130. A rather specialized category is that of utility terminations. See, e.g., Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1972). In these
cases, the debtor challenges the utility's termination of service for nonpayment of bills. The
Court has found state action only where the state rather than a private party owns the utility
company. Thus, the fortuitous circumstance of ownership controls whether the utility's
termination procedures must comport with due process standards. The Flagg decision does
nothing to diminish reliance on ownership as indicative of state action in this context.
Another area, which has received little attention, is extra-judicial mortgage foreclosures.
See, e.g., Charmicor v. Deaner, 572 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1978). See generally Nelson,
ConstitutionalProblems With Power of Sale Real Estate Foreclosure:A Judicial Dilemma,
43 Mo. L. REv. 25 (1978). In this category, a mortgage contract will provide that, upon
default, the mortgagee may sell the encumbered property without resort to judicial process.
As in the utility context, state action often turns on whether the mortgagee is a private entity
or a governmental agency. Where the mortgagee is a governmental agency, the courts find
state action and hold that due process requires a judicial hearing prior to foreclosure. A
different outcome results, however, where the mortgagee is a private party. In this situation,
the courts conclude there is no state action. Compare Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp.,
519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975) (no state action) with Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp.
133 (D. Me. 1976) (state action). As state action is contingent upon the mortgagee's identity,
Flagg's decision has little relevance to this area.
131. Courts were divided when the question whether self-help repossession constituted
state action first arose. Compare Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (state
action) with Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (no state action).
The overwhelming majority now answer this question in the negative. This result has been
reached without the Supreme Court ever addressing the issue. In fact, the Court has been
determinedly silent on the question, denying certiorari on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978); Calderon v. United Furniture, 505 F.2d 950
(5th Cir. 1974); Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner v. Impala Motors, 503
F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Gibbs v. Garver, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank, 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank, 497 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1974);
Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974);
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). See generally Thompson, supra note
107.
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property. 3 1 Yet this distinction is immaterial since the UCC explicitly confines self-help repossession to situations involving no breach
of the peace.'3 The decision in Flagg, because it involved a similar
remedy, reinforces the conclusion that self-help repossession does
3
not constitute state action.

The state action limitation may also be employed in the area of
lien foreclosures.' The impact of Flagg's state action analysis on
such foreclosures is difficult to anticipate because they span a multitude of factual configurations. One generalization, however, can
be advanced: state action may depend on who has possession of the
property subject to the lien. Where the creditor already has possession, Flagg's holding renders it unlikely that state action will be
found. In contrast, Flagg does not affect cases finding state action
where the lienor gains possession of property through unauthorized
3
entry into the debtor's premises. 1
CONCLUSION

Within the last decade, various creditor remedies have come
under constitutional attack as violative of due process. One such
remedy is the warehouseman's foreclosure sale under section 7-210.
In adjudicating these claims, courts have divided on the threshold
question of state action. Faced with contradictory holdings, the
Court in Flagg determined that the warehouseman's sale lacks sufficient government involvement to constitute state action. This determination foreclosed any decision on the merits of the due process
challenge.
132. See notes 81-87 supra and accompanying text.
133. "In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of the peace . . . ." U.C.C. § 9-503. Practically, this limitation
confines the utility of self-help repossession to the automobile financing industry. Since
automobiles are frequently left unattended in public places, they can be "peacefully" repossessed more readily than other property. The possibility of repossessing a washing-machine
or other household furnishing without the debtor's consent and without a breach of the peace
is considerably less likely. See generally Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the
U.C. C.: A Constitutionaland Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 767, 782 (1973).
134. See Gibson v. Dixon, 579 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit specifically
relied on Flagg to reject several theories under which the repossession sale of an automobile
might be attributable to the state. "While the decision is not free from ambiguity, it cannot
be doubted after Flagg Bros. that the availability of this creditor's remedy under state law
does not by itself mean that the sale constitutes state action." Id. at 1077 (citations omitted).
135. See list of liens compiled in Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc., 553 F.2d 764, 770-71 (2d
Cir. 1977). See also Note, Statutory and Common Law Repairmen's Liens in Illinois Under
Section 9-310 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 390 (1977).
136. See Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). "[T~he action taken, the entry
into another's home and the sizure of another's property, was an act that possesses many,
if not all, of the characteristics of an act of the State." Id. at 439. Contra, Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975).
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In holding that no state action existed, the Court rejected all
theories by which the warehouseman's conduct might have been
attributed to the state. As a consequence, it will be burdensome to
establish state action in the context of creditor self-help remedies.
Only one basis for state action may retain vitality: the use or threat
of force in implementing the remedy. Overall, Flagg's holding may
dissuade aggrieved debtors from bringing suit in federal courts, forcing them to pursue alternative forums.
The Court's restrictive analysis of state action is not without precedent. Much of the Court's reasoning, however, is conceptually
deficient. In particular, the Flagg Court failed to enunciate a workable test for ascertaining state action in subsequent cases. This omission significantly undermines the decision's precedential value.
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